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Abstract 
This paper takes a socio-economic approach to considering money in relation to real 
experience, focusing on the real effects of monetary policy. While most of the economics 
literature focuses on interest-rate setting as the core tool of monetary policy, we focus 
here instead on signalling by the central bank as a mechanism for influencing 
expectations and behaviour in conditions of uncertainty. This involves addressing the 
social-conventional expectations among different groups (a mechanism for dealing with 
uncertainty) applied to their particular ways of framing the real and financial sectors. 
Actual credit conditions faced by borrowers in turn are the outcome of the conventional 
view among banks as a result of their framing and the influence of central bank 
signalling. These relations between central banks, banks and the non-bank public in turn 
normally rest on long-established relations of trust. We consider the real effects of 
monetary policy in circumstances where trust has broken down. 
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Introduction 
Economists increasingly acknowledge the social aspect of economic life. It has become 
commonplace, even in mainstream economics, to make reference to Adam Smith’s 
Theory of Moral Sentiments, for example. But the implications of taking on board the 
significance of social processes for economic outcomes are potentially profound. In 
considering the effects of monetary policy, the social aspects of human knowledge and of 
the nature of money are of particular importance. Yet only in non-mainstream economics 
is sociality taken seriously enough to influence the approach to theorising. It is well 
established now that mainstream economics rests on methodological individualism 
whereby sociality is treated as a modification to the preferences of and constraints on 
atomistic individuals, rather than something which is built into the foundations (see, for 
example, Davis 2003). 
 A critique of this mainstream economics approach when applied to money has 
been the focus of Geoffrey Ingham’s contribution to monetary theory. His remarkable 
achievement has been to bring together the fields of sociology and economics in his 
analysis of the nature of money. As an economist, I cannot speak to the implications for 
sociology, but the implications for economics are far-reaching. By exploring the different 
ontologies of money in the mainstream approach to theory and in his alternative social 
theory, Ingham (2004) demonstrates how they feed into theory and policy and thus 
reality. His work has had a profound influence on the non-mainstream theory of money. 
 For Ingham, money is a social relation which arises out of debt contracts and thus 
reflects a balance of power relations in society. While Ingham shares the emphasis on the 
role of the state in these power relations associated with chartalism1, he goes further in 
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focusing on the role of power with respect to knowledge. What constitutes reality is itself 
the outcome of power relations, such that knowledge is performative. In the absence of 
‘true’ knowledge, how we understand reality is subject to a variety of influences which 
are primarily social and/or political. Whatever this understanding of reality is in turn 
influences real outcomes. Credit decisions are based on assessments of future risks and 
returns which are based on a particular framing (including an underlying theoretical 
approach to interpreting economic developments), a particular set of institutional 
arrangements and a particular configuration of economic power.2 The importance for the 
eurozone of the institutional arrangements agreed in Maastricht is a clear example. The 
outcome of such power relations (among governments and banks in relation to the real 
economy) is a level and distribution of credit which in turn influences real experience.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to explore these ideas further in the context of 
monetary policy. While Ingham focused on the nature of money, he also drew 
implications for monetary policy on which we will build. We explore first what money is, 
and then what monetary policy means in relation to money as a social relation – how it 
influences the social relation. We are then in a position to consider the consequences of 
monetary policy for real (social) experience. While our understanding of experience is 
mediated by particular framings, nevertheless we adopt the realist position that there is 
something which we can recognise as real experience.  
 
The meaning of money 
In order to explore the meaning of monetary policy we start by reviewing the nature of 
money itself. As Ingham (2004, ch. 1) explains, the mainstream view of money is based 
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on a commodity exchange view of money, which can be analysed in a conventional 
supply–demand framework in the same way as any other commodity. Of course, this has 
caused logical difficulties in that it is not clear what services money provides in 
equilibrium (the benchmark state for all of mainstream theory and the universal state for 
the influential rational expectations approach). Equilibrium is a state where no more 
trades take place.3 The only explanation for holding money which holds some logic in 
this framework is the notion of a buffer stock of liquidity to meet transactions 
requirements when economic outcomes can only be predicted within a probability 
distribution. 
 But the commodity notion of money was inadequate even when money was 
primarily a commodity, that is, made from precious metals. As Ingham explains, the 
value of coins was influenced as much by the degree of authority associated with the 
sovereign’s stamp and the confidence in the coins’ value in exchange. Once bank notes 
became accepted as money, their value also reflected the degree of confidence in the 
ability of the issuer, whether the state or private banks, to redeem notes in coin. Now that  
the overwhelming bulk of what is regarded as money takes the form of bank deposits 
(redeemable normally in notes issued by the central bank4), their value depends on the 
general state of confidence in the banking system. This includes the regulation and 
supervision of commercial banks by the authorities and the system in place should such 
regulation and supervision fail to prevent a bank having trouble meeting its 
commitments.  
 How far bank deposits serve as money therefore depends on social relations, 
between the state, the banking system and the non-bank public, as well as between the 
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banks themselves and the non-bank public. Money’s social role is to provide the basis for 
contracts, including borrowing and lending (Davidson 2002), to provide a safe haven in 
times of turbulence and to denominate and facilitate transactions. All of these functions 
require that money’s value is regarded as stable relative to alternative assets. Following 
Keynes, Ingham identifies the unit of account function as key to the nature of money: a 
commodity used in exchange is only money if it is representative of a unit of account, 
that is, it represents abstract value. This definition of money is historically anterior to 
markets, an argument supported by Heinsohn and Steiger’s work5 (see further Goodhart, 
2003). 
 The social relations which underpin a successful banking system take time and 
experience to build up (see Chick 1986 and chapter 8 of this volume). But the nature of 
the social relations which constitute money changes as the form of money changes. While 
commodity money is the closest to being a pure asset (‘outside money’), it still involves 
an element of ‘moneyness’ from being issued by the state; seignorage is the counterpart 
to this moneyness which effectively provides credit to the state. Once banks issue notes 
and, later in history, deposit entries against which cheques can be issued, they are the 
direct consequence and counterpart of credit. Not only is the confidence in the value of 
money then dependent on confidence in the soundness of the bank’s balance sheet (a 
social relation) but also the nature of money itself arises from the social relation of credit. 
Credit in turn is the outcome of valuations of risk and return, and the confidence in such 
valuations, which arise from conventional knowledge about the borrowers and power 
relations between borrowers and the banks, involving further social relations. The core of 
Ingham’s position is that money is a social relation. 
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The meaning of monetary policy 
Inevitably how we understand money will determine how we view monetary policy. In 
mainstream theory monetary policy focuses on the money stock and the official interest 
rate at which the central bank provides liquidity to the banks (using mechanisms which 
have evolved through different institutional arrangements).6 Money’s primary role is seen 
as being to facilitate transactions. It is understood not to have any consequences in the 
long run other than to determine the price level (it is ‘neutral’ in the long run). The goal 
of monetary policy has therefore increasingly been seen as being to control the price 
level, often put explicitly in the form of an inflation target. The theoretical justification is 
expressed in terms of the rational optimising decision-making of atomistic individuals. 
The demand for money at any time is understood as representing the aggregation of the 
outcome of all these individual decisions while its supply is understood to be under the 
control of the central bank. In practice it proved to be difficult to control the money 
supply, so the official interest rate became the policy instrument, as an indirect means of 
controlling the money supply. If the interest rate is seen as the price of money and the 
demand for money is a stable function of the rate of interest, then it makes no difference 
in this framework which is chosen as the instrument.7 But the move away from 
expressing monetary policy in terms of the money supply has meant that ‘the relationship 
between the orthodox conception of money in economic analysis and practical monetary 
policy is now tenuous to the point of incoherence’ (Ingham, 2004, p. 9; see further 
chapter 7). 
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 The idea of announcing money supply targets, and then inflation targets, was 
understood within mainstream theory principally as a means to assist the private sector in 
forming expectations. Apparent deviations from money’s long-term neutrality meant that 
it was accepted that monetary policy could have real consequences in the short run as 
producers and households mistakenly adjusted their expenditure plans and workers 
suffered from money illusion (not realising the consequences of monetary policy for 
inflation). The more the public’s expectations were aligned to the target path for the 
money supply or inflation, the less likely they would be to mistake monetary 
developments for real developments. 
 This push for transparency first arose from rational expectations theory. But the 
emerging focus on impediments to the proper functioning of free markets within New 
Keynesian theory added particular force to this approach to policy.8 For New Keynesians 
asymmetric information is a fundamental issue, explaining the financial crisis, for 
example, as the result of different parties concealing risk information from each other. As 
New Keynesian theory gained in influence, the push for transparency was extended 
beyond announcing targets to explaining the thinking behind policy decisions. 
‘Signalling’ has therefore now become a major plank of monetary policy, with much care 
going into publications, speeches and press conferences (Geraats, 2002; Dow, Klaes and 
Montagnoli, 2007). 
 This emphasis on transparency as a means of enhancing expectations formation 
might appear to hold something in common with the view of money as a social relation, 
with an emphasis on information. Preda (2007), for example, sees information as a 
common thread in the sociological theory of financial markets. But the premise of the 
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mainstream approach is that the economic system is such that risk is quantifiable and that 
there is therefore such a thing as a true price. Mainstream economic theory presumes the 
future to be knowable, at least within a probability distribution. Asymmetric information 
is thus simply a matter of concealing information; transparency is designed to mitigate 
that, particularly with respect to openness about central bank thinking. 
 But the non-mainstream view of the economic system is that it is open and 
evolving, through institutional change and through agency as well as through social 
conventions. Such a system cannot yield certain knowledge (including certain knowledge 
of risk). The general case is therefore that knowledge is uncertain. Uncertainty increases 
during periods of marked instability, but its pervasiveness in human experience has 
required the evolution of such institutions as monetary systems and also of coping 
mechanisms in the necessary practice of expectations formation. Reliance is therefore 
placed on conventional knowledge which is built up among different groupings according 
to their own framings and conventions.9 It is through its influence on these framings and 
conventions that the central bank conducts monetary policy. This influence in turn 
reflects influence on the central bank both of political processes and also of power within 
the private sector, notably the financial sector. But since money and monetary policy 
involve a balance of social and political forces it is to be expected that instability rather 
than equilibrium will be the outcome (Ingham, 2004, p. 14). 
 Traditionally, monetary policy has been conducted through open market 
operations – the buying and selling of government bonds in order to drive long-term 
interest rates in a particular direction. Increasingly monetary policy focused on short-term 
interest rates, through the setting of an official rate in the repo market and its enforcement 
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through open market operations.10 Central banks are now also trying to influence long 
rates by quantitative easing – the buying of (mostly) government debt leading directly or 
indirectly to additions to banks’ balances with the central bank. 
 Central banks can have a significant impact on financial markets simply because 
they are such large players and thus their transactions have particular influence on market 
expectations. But it is the fact that such actions signal the intent of monetary policy which 
makes them potentially so influential. But, while signalling in the mainstream approach is 
simply a matter of revealing information, the non-mainstream approach sees signalling as 
embedded in the particular framing of monetary policy adopted by policy-makers. More 
generally, the reality of information generation in the financial sector is such that framing 
(the way in which information is understood) is critical to outcomes. The central bank not 
only employs its own framing but also goes further in trying to ensure that others 
understand policy in the same way. The central bank thus seeks to increase its 
persuasiveness by creating an ‘epistemic community’ with the aim both of depoliticising 
monetary policy and of imposing the central bank’s own framing on other groupings 
(Ingham, 2004, p. 146). By using a rhetoric which presents quantitative easing in 
monetarist terms as a significant expansionary push, for example, central banks depict the 
situation as one in which it would be appropriate for banks to expand lending. The policy 
impasse can therefore be understood as the result of a confrontation between this framing 
and the reality of banks’ real experience in the credit market as they understand it (quite 
apart from the way potential borrowers understand it). The outcome of monetary policy 
can thus be understood as itself being a social relation – the outcome of a negotiated 
struggle between different power groupings, each with its own framing. 
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 Forder (2006) traces the way in which monetarist framing has pervaded the 
monetary policy discourse in the UK, while Gabor (2011) takes a discourse approach to 
an analysis of the framing of monetary policy in Romania. Drawing on communications 
theory, Pigeon (2008) develops the mechanisms by which conventional framings are 
established and propagated. He explores in detail for Canada the build-up over decades of 
the mechanisms used to persuade along these lines, ranging from the form taken by 
consultation and communication to the choice of words and metaphors employed. For 
monetary policy he emphasises the efforts made to foster a common framing of inflation 
targeting by means of a common use of language among the different groupings. The 
rhetoric implies that central banks are being transparent with respect to a stock of 
information which it is politically and economically optimal to share. But the gulf 
between theory and practice in monetary policy is evident in the arguments (particularly 
from central banks) against being literally transparent where knowledge is held with 
uncertainty and monetary policy requires judgement (see, for example, Eusepi, 2005). 
 This way of understanding signalling (other than as literal transparency) fits well 
with Pixley’s (2012) analysis of the role of emotion in behaviour in the financial sector 
under uncertainty. She argues that much depends on trust, between all parties. Trust in 
turn depends on successful mechanisms by which confidence is built up in expectations 
about future actions. This in turn requires a shared framing of the policy problem and its 
solutions. As she argues (Pixley, 2012, pp. 222 and 241), the Libor issue highlights the 
importance of trust or lack of trust among the banks. In particular, the central bank may 
deliberately suppress transparency in order to maintain trust. Confidence involves a non-
calculative set of expectations which can be eroded when a particular understanding of 
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the monetary system is challenged by events, as in the banking crisis. Framings are not 
independent of experience, but rather mediate it. However, the experience of crisis which 
erodes confidence turns the issue into one of trust in the agency of banks and central 
banks (Hughes, 2011). The challenge for central banks is to persuade the public to accept 
an understanding of the situation whereby central bank actions can be trusted. Where 
shared understandings along these lines are not achieved, conflicting framings persist and 
trust is not restored. 
  In the next section we turn to considering the different framings of the real social 
effects of monetary policy. 
  
The consequences of monetary policy for real (social) experience 
Conventional non-neutrality 
In mainstream theory, the effects of monetary policy are captured in one or more 
transmission mechanisms. (There has been disagreement about the precise nature of these 
mechanisms.) The Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (1999), involved in the 
practice of monetary policy, sets out a range of mechanisms. But the outcome of the 
transmission is the effect on inflation, since that is the variable to which monetary policy 
is directed within this approach. This representation of the role of modern monetary 
policy is in sharp contrast to the view taken in the UK in the late 1950s in the Radcliffe 
Report (Committee on the Working of the Monetary System, 1959). Here a range of 
goals was identified, the first being a high and stable level of employment, and the 
inevitable scope for potential conflicts between all the goals were accepted and explored. 
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 Monetarist theory, which underpinned UK monetary policy from 1979, identified 
the transmission of an expansionary policy in the spending of new excess money 
balances on assets or goods and services (or the inducement to do so by reduced interest 
rates if that is the policy tool), while a contractionary policy would correspondingly 
induce reduced expenditure. If the starting point was full employment equilibrium, the 
end result would be a rise or fall in inflation, respectively. Now that there is a fear of not 
meeting the inflation target because aggregate demand is too weak, the same analysis is 
currently being employed to explain the policy of quantitative easing (Bank of England, 
2012b). 
 But as mainstream theory developed in the 1980s in the form of rational 
expectations theory, the aim was to channel the transmission as directly as possible into 
expected inflation, in order to minimise short-run changes in expenditure and 
employment (short-run non-neutrality). The New Keynesian focus on transparency adds 
further force to this aim to use monetary policy to influence expectations directly.11 The 
benchmark of long-run full employment equilibrium continues to condition the 
mainstream view of monetary policy as being addressed to controlling inflation. The aim 
is for monetary policy not to affect real experience.  
 But the actual transmission of monetary policy to aggregate demand (via 
expectations) is being inhibited by weak bank lending. In the current conditions central 
banks are clearly having difficulty in exerting influence on banks, either directly through 
the official rate or indirectly through signalling. Banks have been setting high and 
variable mark-ups on the official rate and have been slow to increase lending. This 
provided the rationale for quantitative easing. But this policy is not having the desired 
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effect of increasing credit. There is a lack both of demand for credit and of supply 
because of weak aggregate demand and a high degree of uncertainty combined with 
dimmed animal spirits. But in any case non-mainstream endogenous money theory points 
out that the means by which central banks enforce their official rate is to manage the 
supply of liquidity. Except in times of crisis, had banks wanted more liquidity at the 
official rate, central banks would have supplied it anyway.12 You cannot push on a string. 
 Even where governments have substantial ownership of commercial banks, as in 
the UK at present, monetary policy is not having the desired effect. While efforts 
continue to influence expectations such that the official interest rate will steer the 
economy along a full employment course at 2 per cent inflation, with no real effects, 
actual interest rates continue to diverge from the official rate. Measures, such as the 
‘funding for lending’ scheme in the UK (Bank of England, 2012a), have therefore been 
introduced as a financial inducement to banks to increase lending at reduced rates. 
 It is becoming increasingly tenuous to justify monetary policy in mainstream 
terms of individualistic rational optimising decision making with respect to information 
which, if not known, is knowable. The focus, derived from monetarism, on the money 
stock as the variable which monetary policy addresses (even if indirectly, through interest 
rates) is clearly divorced from real experience. Attention has shifted back to credit (as the 
stumbling block in attempts to manipulate the money supply and thus aggregate demand). 
But the credit market is framed in the mainstream terms of independent supply and 
demand curves, expressed in terms of price (lending rates). The rhetoric of quantitative 
easing retains the old assumption of an exogenous money supply, whereby monetary 
aggregates are determined as a multiple of the monetary base which quantitative easing is 
 203 
designed to expand. The relevance of default risk is understood (due to the influence of 
New Keynesian credit-rationing theory). But, since there is a presumption that this risk 
can be measured objectively (even if concealed from lenders), the analysis may proceed 
in terms of supply and demand with respect to creditworthy borrowers. The effect of 
monetary policy is then the effect on rational choice of a change in price (interest rate). 
Yet the concern is that uncertainty is inhibiting rational choice with respect to both the 
supply of and demand for credit. But uncertainty has no place in the theory. 
 The non-mainstream view of money identifies the non-neutrality of money, but 
also of monetary policy, at different levels. Considering non-neutrality in the mainstream 
sense of affecting output and employment, Post-Keynesian theory, for example, sees the 
potential for monetary policy to affect these variables, that is, to affect real experience, 
even in the long run. The channels through which this may occur are the effect of the 
changing availability of credit and the effect of changing interest rates on plans to invest 
and to consume at a time of less-than-full employment. Monetary policy has its effect on 
the credit decisions of banks and borrowers and the resulting changes in expenditure, 
output and employment. But the volume of credit is the outcome of commercial bank 
decisions, and banks acquire the necessary reserves through the money market. Central 
banks sustain their official interest rate by means of supplying additional liquidity to the 
money market as required, such that the supply of reserves is endogenous to banks’ credit 
policy. The transmission of monetary policy is thus primarily through the credit market.  
 This transmission can occur through a range of channels, given the 
interdependence between different asset markets. But without the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis, heterodox economists take account of segmentation in financial markets. 
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Monetary policy can aim to influence different interest rates, through central bank 
purchase or sale of different types and maturities of assets. Thus, for example, the policy 
of quantitative easing in the UK included purchase of corporate bonds in an attempt 
directly to ease the funding of investment.13 But small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) generally do not have access to the capital market and do not have well-funded 
treasury departments. They thus depend heavily on bank finance, and monetary policy 
can be addressed to influencing the rate banks charge on loans and also banks’ 
willingness to lend. This can be done by manipulating the official rate, but variable mark-
ups demonstrate the limited power of the central bank to determine loan rates. Rather the 
main influence is exercised through central bank communications designed to influence 
the expectations of banks and borrowers about future financial conditions and the future 
state of the economy. Increased bank lending to SMEs facilitates increased production 
and employment and thereby influences real experience. Similarly real household 
experience of consumption and housing is influenced by the cost and availability of 
consumer loans and mortgage loans, respectively. Conversely, a withdrawal of banks 
from lending can lead to bankruptcy, unemployment, reduced consumption and 
foreclosures on mortgages, all potentially causing some kind of real hardship. Central 
bank attempts to address these issues conflict with the efficient-markets narrative which 
has framed so much of their previous policy stance.14 
 The above argument has much in common with the mainstream framework, 
especially New Keynesian theory, which emphasises the credit channel (because of SME 
dependency on bank lending) and which allows for unemployment due to market 
imperfections (especially information asymmetries). But the non-neutrality of money in 
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non-mainstream theory also applies at a different, more fundamental, level. We proceed 
to explore the implications for additional real effects of monetary policy which arise 
because of money being a social relation. We focus on the two senses in which money is 
a social relation: the social framework of credit as it affects banks’ credit strategies on the 
one hand and the trust in money based in experience of the operations of the state and the 
banking system as a whole on the other hand. Both are important for how monetary 
policy affects real experience. We address each in turn. 
 
Non-conventional non-neutrality I: credit as a social relation 
Within a non-mainstream framework supply and demand for credit are interdependent 
because of the shared significance of uncertainty with respect to expectations. Thus 
Minsky (1975) showed the supply of credit contracting when lender’s risk increased and 
the demand for credit contracting when borrower’s risk increased. Since it is the short 
end of the market which dominates, it is bank perceptions which are more important 
when there is unsatisfied demand for credit. Perceptions of these risks may differ, but in 
times of high uncertainty they are subject to common influences. But monetary policy in 
the form of promoting a particular framing of the economic situation actively promotes a 
shared conventional understanding of expected risk and return, and thus increased 
interdependence between supply and demand. It is therefore common, as now, in weak 
economic conditions for low credit growth to prompt accusations that banks are unduly 
restricting the availability of credit. But it is equally common for such accusations to be 
countered by the argument that demand for credit is weak. Both banks and potential 
borrowers are expressing their strong liquidity preference in reducing both supply of and 
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demand for credit. The outcome is continued weakening in output and employment and 
living standards. 
 The real experience of the credit market itself is a negotiation between borrower 
and lender, each framing the decision according to their own judgements and neither with 
objective knowledge of default risk. The decision cannot be rational in the mainstream 
sense, given uncertainty: reason applied to knowledge must be supplemented by 
conventional opinion and by emotion (Pixley, 2012; Dow, 2011). Further the negotiation 
depends on the relative power of the parties concerned – whether the borrower is a large 
multinational company or a small start-up, for example. Monetary policy, as we have 
seen, involves signalling with respect to central bank analysis and intentions. But, in a 
non-mainstream framework, it also involves efforts to frame economic conditions in a 
particular way. This framing feeds through into the credit decision. 
 An example is provided by the regional finance literature. The mainstream portion 
of this literature frames financial markets as equilibrating, such that banks distribute 
credit (subject to the volume of reserves as determined by the central bank) to regions 
with the highest marginal productivity of capital, thus promoting regional economic 
convergence. The regional impact of monetary policy is thus not considered any further 
than the sectoral impact. The Post-Keynesian literature, on the other hand, sees bank 
credit as endogenously determined by the banking system and created in different regions 
according to conventional understandings of region-specific risk and return. But SME 
borrowers in peripheral regions are  little understood by banks located in big financial 
centres. Relatively high uncertainty discourages lending to them. Yet, given the weak 
knowledge base, events such as natural resource discovery in such regions can 
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dramatically change the way in which these economies are framed, encouraging 
substantial capital inflows. But, given the weak knowledge base, these flows are 
vulnerable to sudden reversals, which have a devastating effect on financially vulnerable 
regions.15 Given this vulnerability, monetary policy will have an exaggerated effect on 
peripheral economies (see Dow and Rodriguez Fuentes, 2003; Dow and Montagnoli, 
2007). The more regional credit is administered by local financial institutions with a 
framing of risk and return which is built on real experience, the more protected are 
peripheral economies from credit volatility. Removing regional (or indeed other) 
segmentation from financial markets, in contrast, can promote economic divergence 
rather than convergence, as in the EU (Chick and Dow, 2012). 
 
Non-conventional non-neutrality II: money as a social relation 
But if money itself, as the outcome of credit decisions, is a social relation, then money is 
non-neutral in an even more fundamental way. Money forms the basis for all sorts of 
other social relations, such as contracts, denomination of wealth and exchange.  But what 
acts as money is itself a social relation; there is a social convention underpinning the 
identification of particular assets as money. This is something which evolves with 
experience and with the institutional arrangements by which money is issued. Thus the 
modern dominance of bank deposits as money is the result of a long history of the 
evolution of banking and its relationship with the state. The framing which reflects 
confidence in banks has a clear social basis, since in rationalist terms the basis of 
confidence is weak. Fractional-reserve banking means that, in the event of a bank run, 
banks cannot conceivably meet all their obligations to redeem deposits in notes and coin. 
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It is confidence in the institutional framework and the agency of the authorities to prevent 
the incidence of bank runs which overrides such considerations. This traditional role of 
central banks which evolved from the experience of bank runs (or the threat of runs) in 
the past reflected an appreciation of the crucial role of money. Without money, a 
capitalist form of economic organisation is inconceivable (Dillard, 1987). Money can 
have no more powerful role to play in real social experience. 
 In normal times, monetary policy is not seen as impacting on this role of money. 
Mainstream theory of monetary policy is addressed to inflation, which could be seen as 
ensuring that national money continues to perform its function. Inflation erodes the store-
of-value function of money. But, because equilibrium theory is unable to explain 
money’s full socioeconomic role (far less its function as a store of value), the justification 
for controlling inflation tends either to be rather tortuous or to appeal to the very different 
considerations of the distributional effects on borrowers and lenders. 
 But the banking crisis has brought to the surface the whole issue of the degree of 
society’s confidence in money. If there is a real or perceived risk of banks going 
bankrupt, then depositors start to focus on whether or not these deposits are indeed a 
good store of value. Inflation recedes into the background as the primary focus of 
monetary policy in times of crisis and attention turns to ensuring the viability of the 
banking system itself. Indeed where the banking crisis has been compounded by a fiscal 
crisis, the viability of the state itself has been open to question (evidenced in the 
escalation of yields on sovereign debt). The very fact that questions are raised about bank 
viability punctures the conventional confidence which had been built up over centuries of 
experience with banks and their relationship with the state. Hence the tremendous 
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potency of visual media images of queues outside the UK’s Northern Rock bank 
branches in 2007.  
 Central banks have been acting to rebuild confidence in the banking system by 
discussing proposals for regulatory change, some of which have the potential to impact 
on borrowers’ experience (restrictions on mortgage loans for example). But shorter-term 
policies such as quantitative easing, which are partly designed to improve bank balance 
sheets, are having little impact on the cost and availability of credit. The emphasis 
otherwise has been on signalling in the broad sense of framing the problem in a particular 
way. Thus, for example, central banks have focused on the shortcomings of banks, /with 
their ‘too big to fail’ recourse to the lender-of-last-resort facility, as the cause of the 
banking crisis. Banks are depicted as having succumbed to moral hazard. This taps 
effectively into the public concern with bankers’ remuneration and the focus on agency 
when trust breaks down (Hughes, 2011). Yet the lender-of-last-resort facility had 
emerged as part of an arrangement between banks and the central bank whereby banks 
were supported in their endeavours to supply society’s money in exchange for regulation 
and supervision. But the process of deregulation which had proceeded from the 1970s 
allowed banks to be exposed to ever higher and ever more opaque risks at the same time 
as increasing in scale, such that most became too big to fail because of the impact that 
such failure would have on socioeconomic relations. Not only had banks gone back on 
the deal, but so had central banks. Central banks’ focus on the moral hazard of banks 
constructed a narrative which distracted attention from their own moral hazard. Indeed, 
the moral hazard has been the danger of a breakdown in social relations (Dow, 2012). 
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Conclusion 
Money functions as a social relation based on conventional practices and attitudes. We 
have seen how the banking crisis has eroded confidence in bank-issued money, and even 
in the state itself. The uncertainty which has resulted has had profound real effects. 
Because of a high degree of uncertainty, firms are unwilling to invest, households are 
unwilling to spend. Banks, companies and households seek liquidity. The resulting 
recession worsens the public sector finances. Because these finances are framed by a 
mainstream economics approach which promotes budgetary balance, the resulting policy 
is fiscal austerity, which in turn worsens the deficit. Where successful, government 
rhetoric persuades society that this short-term pain is justified by the long-term gain. But 
fiscal austerity erodes the role of the state in providing social services, at a time when 
income distribution is becoming ever more polarized. 
 While mainstream theory subsumes uncertainty in quantifiable risk, it has been 
impossible to ignore uncertainty in public discourse. But the way in which it is 
understood is framed by the theoretical approach used. Thus, just as emotions are treated 
as random disturbances to outcomes generated by rationally optimising individuals, so 
uncertainty is treated as a random shock. Yet the two are intimately connected (Pixley, 
2012). In Post-Keynesian economic theory, uncertainty is endemic and underlines the 
social role of money as a refuge from uncertainty. 
 Mainstream theory of monetary policy approaches the question of the real effects 
of monetary policy in terms of short-term non-neutrality as a result of market 
imperfections, notably information asymmetries. Monetary policy is now addressed as 
much to aligning expectations with a mainstream framing of policy and its effects, such 
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that the real effects of policy are minimised, as to manipulating interest rates and the 
money supply. As policy confronts real experience, however, the incoherence of this 
approach is exposed and alternative measures are sought to improve real experience. 
 The non-mainstream approach has explained the long-term non-neutrality of 
money and monetary policy in standard Keynesian terms. But here we have focused on 
more fundamental aspects of money’s non-neutrality, which arises from its nature as a 
social relation. From this follows a more fundamental non-neutrality of monetary policy. 
This has become particularly evident in the banking crisis, where the social relations 
underpinning money are threatened. 
 These are extraordinary times. They follow the ‘great moderation’ and the ‘new 
consensus’ on monetary policy, whereby there was a dominant narrative among 
mainstream theorists and policy-makers. An epistemic community had been created such 
that monetary policy was understood as a technical matter designed not to have real 
consequences. Public confidence was such that monetary policy did not attract significant 
critical attention. The central bank narrative dominated, not least because it supported the 
interests of the financial sector. 
 But the crisis drove a wedge between the interests of the financial sector, the 
central bank and the public. Further, the central bank narrative had been based on an 
assumption of financial stability which was clearly at odds with the real experience of 
financial markets. Critical attention was therefore increasingly focused on central bank 
actions and their impact on that real experience. New monetary policy measures have 
thus been introduced, which were often at odds with the way in which the role of 
monetary policy continued to be framed. Central banks have adapted their practice in the 
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face of real experience, but continue to apply a traditional (monetarist) framing which 
banks refuse to accept (that an injection of reserves should translate into new lending). 
Conflict therefore continues between central banks’ efforts to increase bank lending on 
the one hand and the banks’ understanding of the risks involved in such lending on the 
other hand. The non-bank public’s understanding of their own experience of financial 
vulnerability, in turn, has put a critical focus on the banks, such that policy with respect 
to banks is now an important political issue. The framings of different groups in society 
are evolving in themselves and in relation to each other in an ongoing process of 
negotiation. The signs are there that monetary policy too is a social relation. 
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1
   See Goodhart (1998) for a discussion of chartalism. 
2
 This approach to money echoes that of Niebyl (1946) in his analysis of classical 
monetary theory, where he identified a dialectical process of influence from real 
experience to ideas to policy to real experience and so on, all mediated by power 
relations. 
3
 See Chick’s (1983, pp. 213–18) critique of Tobin’s monetary theory along these lines. 
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4
 There are exceptions, as in Scotland and Northern Ireland, where deposits with private 
banks are redeemable in their own notes and where central-bank-issued notes are not 
legal tender. See 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/Pages/about/scottish_northernireland.aspx. 
5
 See for example Heinsohn and Steiger (2006) for a recent account. 
6
 See Goodhart (2007) for a more full account of the evolution of the mainstream theory 
of monetary policy, and Gabor (forthcoming) for its use in rationalising different policy 
measures. 
7
 Since the underlying relations were understood to be stochastic, it could nevertheless be 
significant for the outcome of monetary policy which had the higher variance. Thus the 
choice between the money supply and the interest rate as the policy instrument would 
depend on the particular specification of the IS and LM curves (see Poole, 1970).  
8
 Politics were also important for the move to transparency. Pigeon (2008) explores the 
political factors influencing the rise of transparency in fiscal as well as monetary policy 
in Canada. 
9
 See Dow (forthcoming) for a socioeconomic discussion of framing with respect to 
financial markets. 
10
 The repo rate is the rate at which the central bank supplies liquidity by buying assets 
from banks subject to an agreement by the banks to repurchase them at a specified price 
after a set period (such as two weeks). 
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11
 To the extent that New Keynesians identify non-neutrality of money in the short run, it 
is a result of credit rationing. The argument is that borrowers conceal true risk from 
lenders, who then use the rule of thumb that it is better to restrict availability of credit by 
rationing than to raise interest rates, which would encourage more risk-taking by 
borrowers. 
12
 The extreme case of the banking crisis beginning in 2007 was such that the interbank 
market through which the central bank enforces the official rate actually froze, requiring 
proactive supply of liquidity by central banks.  
13
 In practice the bulk of quantitative easing has occurred in the sovereign debt market. 
14
 See Gabor (2012) for an account of the different crisis measures adopted by Japan and 
the ECB and their theoretical justifications. 
15
 The South East Asia crisis in 1997 provides an exemplar of this phenomenon, whereby 
massive capital inflows based on very limited knowledge were suddenly reversed. Pixley 
(2012) documents more recent behaviour by German banks along these lines, even after 
the onset of crisis in 2007. 
